The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resilience
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Figures
v
List of Tables
vi
Acknowledgements
vii
Curriculum Vitae
ix
Abstract of Dissertation
xx vi
Chapter 1 :
Introduction
1
Chapter 2 : Literature Review:
Three Levels of Illicit Network Analysis:
Internal, Domestic and Global
31
Chapter 3 :
Illicit Network Re silience: A Theory
7 3
Chapter 4 : Methodology
9 9
Chapter 5 : The Resilience of th e Arellano - Félix Organization
117
Chapter 6 : The US - Mexico Reaction to the Arellano Felix Organization
1 51
Chapter 7 : Conclusion: A General Argument of
I llicit Network Resilience
176
Bibliography
191
Appendix A : Organization Chart -
Mexican Drug Trafficking 1980‟s (Cooperative and Centralized Under El Padrino )
234
Appendix B: AFO Structure Post 1991(Simplified)
235
Appen dix C: Organizational Chart AFO 1991 - 1995
236
Appendix D : Organizational Chart AFO 1995 - 1997
237
Appendix E : Organizational Chart AFO 1997 - 2002
238
Appendix F
Organizational Chart AFO 2002 - 2006
239
iv
Appendix G: Organization Chart AFO 2006 - 2008
240
Appendix H: Organization Chart Teo Faction 2008 - January 2010
241
Appendix I : Fernando Sanchez Arellano Organization (FSO) April 2008 - January 2010
242
Appendix J: AFO Reward Poster
243
Appendix K: AFO Reward Poster 2000‟s
244
Appendix L : Study Information Sheet
245
Appendix M : Interview Questionnaire
249
Appendix N : Interview Subject Chart
254
Appendix O : List of Acronyms and Glossary of Important Terms
247
Appendix P : Timeline of Major event s in AFO History
257
Appendix Q : Large Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization
by Busines s Model a nd
Author‟s Present Perceived Strength Based on Media and Expert Accounts 2011
265
Appendix R: Cartel Arrest Data adapted from NPR examination of arrest s
265
Appendix S: Cartel Bribe Data adapted from NPR analysis
267
Appendix T : The Extended State Reaction Model of
Profit - Seeking Illicit Network Resilience
268
v
List of Figures
Page
Figure 1. Types
of Illicit N etworks
11
Figure 2.
The State Reaction and Illicit Network Resilience
28
Figure 3. Chain, Wheel and All - Channel Networks
42
Figure 4.
UNODC Pilot Study 2002 -
O rganizational Structure Models
45
Figure 5 .
Capillary and Double - Funnel Trafficking Models
65
Figure 6 .
Combining the Double - Funnel Model and the Wheel Network
67
Figure 7 . Combining the Double - Funnel Model and the Chain Network
69
Figure 1.
Types
of Illicit N etworks
77
Figure 8 . The Relationship between Hierarchy and Busines s Model in Illicit Networks
8 1
Figure 9 . Resilience
Typology
8 6
Figure 2 . The S tate Reaction and
Illicit Network Resilience
90
Figure 1 0 .
Organization Chart -
Mexican Drug Trafficking 1980‟s
123
Figure 11. AFO Structure Post - 1991 (Simpli fied
130
Figure 1 2 . Kidnappings in Tijuana 2006 - September
2011
1 44
Figure 1 3 . Kidnappings, Homicides and Extortio ns in Tijuana 2006 - September 2011
168
Figure 1 4 . Tijuana Homicides 2006 - September 201 1
169
vi
List of Tables
Table 1. Territor ial Versus Transactional:
Business Strategy in 26 Areas
83
Table 2. Timeline of Major events in AFO History
118
vii
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank
my
advisors Caesar D. Sereseres and Etel Solingen for feedback, advice,
and counseling through the long process of finishing a dissertation. The advice of advisors ,
both academic and personal ,
has proven critical to its completion . I cannot thank you both enough.
I would like to thank my dissertation committee member Profe ssor Louis Desipio for providing excellent feedback and being willing to jump on the committee to help us all in times of need . I would like to thank dissertation
committee me mber Professor Kamal Sadiq for his enthusiasm, sage advice , and spearheading o f all that is “Illicit Flows.”
I am forever indebted to the men and women of law enforcement who dedicated their lives to the pursuit of justice and willingly made time for a young academic without reputation. Thank you for your time, advice, thoughts, expe rtise and giving me my start. I would like to reserve s pecial thanks to my good friend Steve Duncan whose willingness to meet and discuss the dissertation
was
invaluable.
I would like to thank the following people and i nstitutions for their intellectual , financial and personal support:
To my wife
Sofia for her love, support and tolerating my long work hours and late nights.
The Department of Political Science at UC Irvine for providing me time, funding and a well rounded intellectual foundation. Tea ching my way through graduate school was one of the most
intellectually
rewarding experiences of my life.
The Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) for providing me
the fellowship that made field work in Tijuana
and Mexico City
possible.
viii
The Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) at UC Irvine for providing me a forum to receive
feedback on my work and funding preliminary interview trips to Mexico and Washington, D.C.
Colonel Cope of the National Defense University for allowi ng me to intern and soak up his wisdom both personally and substantively.
David Shirk and Viridiana Rios of the Transborder Institute for their advice feedback and encouragement.
The InsightCrime.org team for helping me to write better and publish regu larly on crime and security in Mexico.
Colegio De La Frontera Norte , Tijuana (COLEF) for providing me an intellectually vibrant place to base my fieldwork and write.
Special thanks to Professor Rosio Barrajas for that most amazing of all gifts ;
my own office.
I would like to thank Professor Jose Maria Ramos
( my COLEF advisor )
for taking me under his wing and letting me bounce ideas off of him for hours on end.
Any errors are my own.
ix
Curriculum Vitae
Nathan P. Jones
NJONES@UCI.EDU
Education :
UC Irvine 2004 - 2011
PhD in the Political Science focusing on international relations and security issues related to Latin America.
Dissertation Title: The
State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resilience.
A histo rical case study of the illicit network structure and resiliency of the drug trafficking organization commonly referred to as the Tijuana cartel.
PhD to be awarded Fall 2011.
Masters Political Science Fall 2008
Cumulative GPA: 3.908
Colegio de La Fron tera Norte, Tijuana (COLEF) 2011
Attended COLEF while doing fieldwork in Tijuana. January - June 2011.
UC Berkeley 1999 - 2003
Cumulative GPA: 3.47
Major GPA: 3.85
Bachelors Political Science (High Honors)
Honors Thesis on Regime Stability in Syria
x
Pu blications:
“Applying Lessons From Colombia to Mexico” Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars: Mexico Institute. Al Dia. December 2, 2010.
http://mex icoinstitute.wordpress.com/2010/12/03/applying - lessons - from - colombia - to - mexico/
“Goat - Horns, Blackbirds and Copkillers: The Flow of Guns from the United States into Mexico.”
November 22, 2010. Appendix of the Center For Strategic and International Stu dies (CSIS) policy proposal report on US - Mexico Counternarcotics Efforts organized by Sidney Weintraub and Duncan Wood. http://csis.org/files/publication/101108_We intraub_MexicanUSAntinarc_web.pdf
“InSight: Report Tracks How Intra - Cartel Wars Exploded in Mexico.” Wednesday, February 09, 2011. http://insightcrime.org/insight - latest - news/item/548 - insight - report - tracks - how - intra - cartel - wars - exploded - in - mexico
“Kidnapping in Tijuana: The New Normal.” Insightcrime.org. May 31, 2011. http://insightcrime.org/investigations/insight - exclusives/item/1002 - kidnapping - in - tijuana - the - new - normal
Arrest of Tijuana Ex - Mayor: Putting Crime in the 'Freezer'? June 5, 2011. http://www.insightcrime.org/insight - latest - news/item/1033 - arrest - of - tijuana - ex - mayor - putting - crime - in - the - freezer
Key Lieutenant's Testi mony Could Bring Tijuana Drug Lord to Justice Monday, July 11, 2011. http://insightcrime.org/insight - latest - news/item/1 213 - key - lieutenants - testimony - could - bring - tijuana - drug - lord - to - justice
xi
Cartel Lieutenant‟s Capture Could Bring Tijuana a Step Closer to War. Monday, 18 July 2011. http://insightcrime.org/insight - latest - news/item/1248 - cartel - lieutenant%E2%80%99s - capture - could - bring - tijuana - a - step - closer - to - war
Measuring Reforms to Mexico's Broken Justice System. June 28, 201 1. http://insightcrime.org/insight - latest - news/item/1148 - measuring - reforms - to - mexicos - broken - justice - system
Why Extraditing Mexico Tra ffickers Could Strengthen US Gangs. August 18, 2011. http://insightcrime.org/insight - latest - news/item/1431 - why - extradit ing - mexico - drug - traffickers - could - strengthen - us - gangs
Why the US Doesn‟t Have Mexico - Style Drug Cartels… Yet. August 16, 2011. http://www.insightcrime.org/insight - latest - news/item/1414 - why - the - us - doesnt - have - mexico - style - drug - cartels - yet
Review of Sylvia Longmire‟s Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico‟s Drug Wars. September 30, 2011. InsightCrime.org. http://www.insightcrime.org/insight - latest - news/item/1647 - cartel - the - coming - invasion - of - mexico%E2%80%99s - drug - wars
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Upcoming Publications
Defense Intelligence Agency (National Defense Intelligence College) project on bilateral security issues in Mexico. The Four Phases of the Arellano - Félix Organization.
Presented in Guadalajara Mexico at Universidad de Guadalajara
February 18 - 21, 2010.
"Ejércitos de usuarios y el uso del secuestro por los carteles de las drogas: Consecuencias
no intencionales de las estrategias de los barones de las drogas." (An Army of Users and the Use of Kidnapping by Drug Cartels: The Unintended Consequences of Ki ng - pin Strategies.) Nathan Jones. Colegio de la Frontera Norte de Tijuana. June 29, 2011.
Book Chapter edited by Katherine Tate UC Irvine, “„California Dreaming‟: Explaining Mexico‟s Quixotic Foreign Policy on California‟s Proposition 19.”
xiii
Media Ap pearances:
Interviewed KPBS Radio Frontera
Desk on the Impact of the Arrest of “Hank” Rhon former Mayor of Tijuana on Firearms Charges. http://www.kpbs .org/news/2011/jun/07/former - tijuana - mayor - suspected - illegal - firearms - po/
Interviewed on the impact of the arrest of “El Ruedas,” KPBS Evening Edition, November 9, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PL2BEE055A0FBFA666&feature=player_embedde d&v=5uLIds1_MXs
xiv
Graduate Course Work:
US - Latin - American Security Relations
Professor Sereseres
Fall 2004
Foundations of Modern Political Theory
Professor Easton
Fall 2004
International Relations Theory
Professor Morgan
Winter 2005
Micro - Politics
Professor Rosenberg
Winter 2005
Macro - Politics
Professor Solingen
Spring 2005
International Relations Theory of East Asia
Profes sor Uriu
Spring 2005
Approac hes to International Relations
Professor Uriu
Fall 2005
Religion in International Politics
Professor Lynch
Fall 2005
History of Political Thought
Professor Olson
Winter 2006
Regime Change East Asia
Professor Solinger
Spring 2006
Game Theory of International Relations
Professor McGann
Fall 2006
International Security
Professor Sereseres
Fall 2006
Rethinking Otherness
Professor Brunstetter
Winter 2007
Counterinsurgency
Professor Sereseres
Spring 2007
Qual itative Interpretive Methods
Professor Lynch
Spring 2007
Illicit Flows
Professor Sadiq
Winter 2008
Homeland Security
Professor Sereseres
Fall 2008
ICPSR Graduate Statistics program University of Michigan Summer 2005
Regression 1 and Game Theory taught by Dean Lacy of Ohio State University.
Audited the Graduate Seminar the Just War with Professor Daniel Brunstetter.
xv
Study Abroad/Language Skills
Lived in Cuernavaca Mexico for approximately 3 months in the summer of 2007 and took six weeks of in tensive immersion language courses at Universidad Internacional (UNINTER) (3 years of study equivalent). Proficient in written and spoken Spanish.
Attended Colegio de La Frontera Norte
in Tijuana a graduate University Specializing in the Northern borde r of Mexico 2010 - 2011 academic year. Fieldwork conducted in Spanish.
Intern Experience
Research Intern (Fall 2007)
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)
National Defense University (NDU) Fort McNair
Duties included translations from Spanish to English of government documents and other materials. Kept abreast of world and Latin American news relevant to American security policy. Assisted in the organization of a conference on the security of the United States Southern approach, including Mex ico, the Caribbean and Central America. Provided succinct summaries and analyses of conferences, seminars and workshops.
xvi
Relevant TA Experience:
Teaching Assistant US Civil Liberties 171A Professor Buzan Fall 2004
General Teaching Effectiveness Score:
6.54 out of 7
Teaching Assistant US Supreme Court 174CW Professor Petracca Winter 2005
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.0 out of 7
Teaching Assistant Anthropology 2D Linguistics and Culture Professor Boellstorf Spring 2005 General Teaching Effecti veness Score: 5.8 of 7
Teaching Assistant Intro to Law 71A Professor Buzan Fall 2005
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.13 of 7
Teaching Assistant US Coercive Diplomacy 142G Professor Sereseres Winter 2006
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.53
of 7
Teaching Assistant Latin American Revolutions Professor Duncan Spring 2006
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.31 of 7
Teaching Assistant US Intervention in Latin America Professor Duncan Winter 2007.
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.48 of 7
Teaching Assistant Latin American Revolutions Professor Duncan Spring 2007
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: NA
Teaching Assistant Race in Latin America Professor Duncan Spring 2007
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: NA
xvii
UCDC Grad Fellow in Wa shington, D.C., TAing courses in Monuments and Memorials and a Washington DC Seminar for UCDC students doing internships.
Teaching Assistant US Coercive Diplomacy 142G Professor Sereseres Winter 2008
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.38 of 7
Teach ing Assistant Political Theory Professor Kevin Olson Spring 2008 General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.11 of 7
Legal Implications of the Drug Trade Federal Judge David Carter Fall 2008
Teaching Assistant US Coercive Diplomacy 142G Professor Sereseres W inter 2009
Legal Implications of the Drug Trade: Federal Judge Carter Spring 2009 General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.01 of 7
Teaching Assistant US Coercive Diplomacy 142G Professor Sereseres Winter 2010
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: Not yet
available
Teaching Assistant Multicultural Education 124 Lecturer Laurie Hansen Spring 2010
xviii
Lecturing Experience
Lecturer for International Studies 12/Political Science 44A Global Issues and Institutions
Summer Session II at UC Irvine. Lectured a lower
division survey course on topics such as intergovernmental organizations like the UN, NGO‟s, insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, failed states, migration, transnational criminal organizations, political - economy, and the history of the international state - system.
Lecturer Introduction to International Relations Theory at UCI Summer session II 2010.
Guest Lecture on Mexican and Colombian Drug Trafficking for Federal Judge David Carter‟s Legal Implications of the Drug Trade UC Irvine Fall 2009 and 2 010
Guest Lecture on Preemptive vs. Preventive War for Professor Daniel Brunstetter‟s Just War Revisited Course 2008.
Introduction to International Relations Theory. University of San Diego Fall 2011.
xix
Awards :
Letter of congratulations from the Dean of S ocial Sciences on Top 10 ranking for all social science TAs (March, 2005).
Excellence in Teaching Award from the Department of Political Science for Winter 2006 US Coercive Diplomacy.
Global Connect Award 2008 for Graduate Student Presentation on What Is T errorism?
Global Connect Award 2009 for Graduate student Presentation on Counterinsurgency and Failed States.
Dissertation Fellow Department of Political Science UC Irvine Fall 2009
Excellence in Teaching Award from the Department of Political Science fo r Winter 2010 US Coercive Diplomacy.
Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) Award 2010
Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) Fellow 2010 - 11 –
Provided one year of funding for field work and dissertation completion to be carr ied out in Mexico. Currently in Mexico City researching for dissertation.
Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) Research Award Recipient and Affiliate 2010.
James Danziger Award for Teaching Excellence 2011 UC Irvine Political Science.
xx
Conference Presentations:
International Studies Association March 2006 Just War, Pacifism and the Holy See
a panel presentation.
International Studies Association February/March 2007 The Decision to Invade and the Iraqi Insurgency as a Market Entry/Exi t Game
ISA West San Francisco 2008 --
Using Counterinsurgency Strategy to Reassert the Westphalian State Against Criminal Networks: The Case of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico
ISA National New York 2009 --
Using Counterinsurgency Strategy to Reassert the West phalian State Against Criminal Networks: The Case of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico
The Four Phases of the Arellano - Felix Organization.
Presented in Guadalajara Mexico at Universidad de Guadalajara
February 18 - 21, 2010. National Defense Intelligence College
(Defense Intelligence Agency).
The Four Phases of the Arellano - Felix Organization.
Presented in Washington, DC. May 25, 2010. National Defense Intelligence College (Defense Intelligence Agency).
xxi
Territorial Cartels and the Reaction of the State: The Arellano Felix Organization in Mexico . Panel Discussant The War on Terror and Counterinsurgency Issues . International Studies Association - West --
Los Angeles. September 25 - 26, 2010.
Panel Chair ISA West 2010 –
Los Angeles. Panel on Counterinsurgency .
The State and Illicit Network Structures . Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation Southern California Symposium. UC Irvine campus. January 14, 2011.
Illicit Network Business Models. Kidnapping and the Tijuana Cartel. Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies. UC Irvine Campus. April 2011.
“La reacción del Estado mexicano frente al crimen organizado: una teoría de la elasticidad” Colegio de la Frontera Norte de Tijuana. June 16, 2011. Presentation in Spanish.
" Ejércitos de usuario s y el uso del secuestro por los carteles de las drogas: Consecuencias
no intencionales de las estrategias de los barones de las drogas ." (An Army of Users and the Use of Kidnapping by Drug Cartels: The Unintended Consequences of King - pin Strategies.) Na than Jones. Colegio de la frontera Norte de Tijuana. June 29, 2011.
xxii
"Ejércitos de usuarios y el uso del secuestro por los carteles de las drogas: Consecuencias
no intencionales de las estrategias de los barones de las drogas."
(An Army of Users and t he Use of Kidnapping by Drug Cartels: The Unintended Consequences of King - pin Strategies.) Nathan Jones. Universidad Autónoma Baja California, Mexicali. October 27 - 28, 2011 en la Segundo Foro Binacional: El Impacto Social de la Inseguridad Publica en l a Frontera México - Estados Unidos.
Armies of Users and the Unintended Consequences of King - Pin Strategies in the Fight against Drug Trafficking Organizations. Pacific Coast Latin American Studies Association Conference. October 29, 2011.
Three Level s of Illicit Network Analysis: A Literature Review. International Studies Association West 2011, Pasadena 2011.
xxiii
Upcoming Conference Presentations
Tijuana’s Counterinsurgency Strategy and Organized Crime . (2008 - 2010). Latin American Studies Associatio n 2012.
Fearing the State: Why Illicit Networks Flatten and Reduce Violence
International Studies Association 2012 San Diego.
Discussant:
Spring 2009 --
UC Irvine Research in International Global Studies (RIGS) Discussant for Presentation of Book Chap ter “ Leveraging Host Governments in War: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq ” by James H. Lebovic
Conference Attendance
Attended two conferences at Colegio De La Frontera Norte
in Tijuana (COLEF) with Associate Dean Caesar Sereseres. Both conferences were o n Mexican Border Security Issues and the Merida Initiative 2008 - 2009.
Attended Global Public Policy Forum on War On Drugs
at University of Texas El Paso (UTEP) and Ciudad Juarez , Mexico September 21 - 22, 2009.
Attended CASEDE Conference in Mexico City o n Organized Crime October 2010.
Attended Stanford - ITAM Conference on Governance in Mexico November 2010.
xxiv
Course Papers and Qualifying Papers:
An Elitist Critique of Laski‟s Pluralism
What Oil and the Military Mean for Democracy in Chavez‟s Venezuela
Just War, Pacifism and the Holy See (Qualifier)
The Role of Alliance in the Democratization of East Asia
Assessing the Permeation of American Political Ideology on the American Catholic Church‟s Foreign Policy
Augustine or Kant? Assessing the US and Germa n Responses to Terrorism
The Catholic Church 411 - 1648 and the International Relations Paradigms
Assessing the Process of “Othering” in Augustinian Just War Tradition
The Origins of Civil War in Iraq
Religious Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons in Internationa l Relations Theory (Qualifier)
Using Counterinsurgency Strategy to Reassert the Westphalian State Against Criminal Networks: The Case of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico (Qualifier)
xxv
Academic Service:
Headed the International Relations Group 2006 - 2007. The IR group is comprised of graduate students with an IR focus. This group helps to build graduate student - faculty relations and allows IR grad students to network and practice conference presentations. We also put on our own conference annually.
Assisted th e undergraduate UC Irvine Model United Nations team put on their annual high school conference. (2005 - 6)
Global Connect 2008 - 9 Graduate Student Presenter –
What is Terrorism?
; What is Counterinsurgency?
And Failed States . Global Connect is a high schoo l outreach program run by UCI undergraduates, which develops curriculums to improve upon local schools‟ ability to educate global citizens. Graduate students provide specialized presentations.
Interim - Administrator Global Connect Winter 2010 –
Duties in clude: Addressing personnel issues, making presentations, running weekly meetings, interfacing with local high school teachers and administrators on Global connect curriculum, etc.
xxvi
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit
Network Resilience
By
Nathan Patrick Jones
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Irvine, 2011
Professor Caesar D. Sereseres, Co - Chair
Professor Etel Solingen, Co - Chair
This dissertation elucidates the rela tionship between
a profit - seeking illicit network ‟s (PSIN‟s)
business strategy
and resilience . The dissertation
finds that
territorial PSIN
business strategies
challenge “ the territorially sovereign state ”
through activities like kidnapping and extortion .
The intensity of the state reaction to the illicit network was the single most important factor in its ability to survive disruptive events. The state ,
in this case Mexico ,
reacted
more intensely
to territorial PSIN‟s in collaboration with civil society , other states and rival “ transactional ”
PSIN‟s. In this case the state (Mexico)
dissolved a territorial PSIN , suggesting that the state is capable of effectively confronting this illicit network type. On the other hand, the case finds
that the state was
corrupted by transactional PSINs whose business strategies made them resilient. This finding suggests that through corruption, transactional PSINs will pose a long - term threat to democratic institutionalization in Mexico and internationally anywhere that
states must address these illicit networks.
xxvii
The dissertation
is an in - depth historical case study of the Tijuana Cartel, also known as the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO). Through archival research and interviews with experts on the illicit network a
case study was constructed. Experts interviewed for the dissertation during nine months of fieldwork in Mexico City and Tijuana, included:
journal ists, law enforcement, scholars, extortion victims and businessmen. Given
the
similar
structures
of illici t networks , the finding s
of this dissertation
have important implications for understanding other drug trafficking organizations , prison gangs, terrorists, insurgencies , arms traffickers,
among a host of other potential “dark network” actors .
1
Chapter 1 Introduction
States and territorial profit-seeking illicit networks (PSINs ) are enemies, because they are so much alike. They are both: territorial, hierarchical, resil ient, prone to violence and funded by taxation. 1 Territorial PSINs threaten the state’s underlying raison d’être, the ability to govern through the taxation of territory. 2 The “predatory” “alternative governance structure” these territorial profit-seeking illicit networks establish through extor tion and kidnap activities, directly challenge states by illicitly taxing the local population and exercising violence within state territory. 3 Territorial profit-seeking illicit networks thus become the pr imary targets for “territorially sovereign states.” 4
1 The conception of the state is heavily influenced by the work of Charles Tilly which views the state as a form of organized crime providing security in exchange for taxation; albeit in a more professionalized fashion than organized crime. Tilly 1990; Tilly 1985; Tilly 198 6; Skaperdas 2001; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1993; S kaperdas 1992. 2 The term profit-seeking illicit network (PSIN) is utilized here because this work situates itself wit hin the literature on illicit networks and illicit flows. To the best of my knowledge this is the first formal use of the term, though “profit-seeking” and “illicit network” have clearly been used by other authors like Michael Kenney and formal government reports on organized crime. The qualit ative sociological network literature provides usef ul concepts that can explain the capability of these criminal a ctors to create “networks of complicity” within the state apparatus (Sadiq 2009). The term “ illicit network” also con notes the transnational character of the project be cause the term is not constrained by the “state-centric discourse, e. g. “non-state actors.” The term “illicit network” is superior to “drug cartel” because these networks have not prove n capable of controlling the supply and price of a given commodity. For excellent discussions of the misuse of the term “cartel” See: Lacey 2009; Cook 2007; Sadiq 2009; Schendel and Abraham 2005. More in-depth discussions of the terms transactiona l versus territorial PSINs will be provided in chap ter three on my state reaction argument. 3 Other terms often used to describe profit-seeking illicit networks include: terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations (TCO’s), clandestine transna tional actors (CTA’s), drug trafficking organizatio ns (DTO’s), illicit networks, “dark networks,” and organized cr iminal groups (OCG’s). The term is superior to drug trafficking organization because these networks are not limited to trafficking illicit narcotics, nor is this alwa ys their primary source of profit in some cases. Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, chap. Introduction; Andr eas 2001; Andreas 2003; Olson and Salazar 2011; Wil liams 1995; Sullivan 2008; Buscaglia, Ratliff, and Gonzal ez-Ruiz 2005; 2010l; Milward 2003. 4 Spruyt 1994.
2
“Transactional” profit-seeking illicit networks, which focus their illicit activities on the trafficking of narcotics, money laundering, front businesses, or othe r non-extortionist activities, become secondary targets for states and are more capable of for ming alliances with states through corruptive collusion. Due to the violent reaction of states (pr ompted by civil society) against territorial PSINs, they tend to be less resilient tha n their “transactional” counterparts. 5
The surviving transactional PSINs form state alliances against their rivals through corruption, thus institutionalizing state-PSIN cooperation that hinders long ter m democratic consolidation. The threat they pose to states is more subtle and insidious than tha t posed by territorial or insurgent illicit networks that seek to supplant the state, or weaken it in c rucial territories through brute force. Transactional PSINs constrain and pervert democra tic consolidation, economic development and the rule of law. The distinction between “transactional” and “territorial” was i nitially published in an Economist article quoting an unknown Mexican government official. My c ontribution has been to develop this brief characterization into a typology, and relate i t to the dependent variable of resilience. 6
While the answer (summarized above) was complex, it began with a simple question. What makes illicit networks resilient? As the research conti nued, the answer to that question was found largely in the answer to another. Why do states attack some illicit networks more aggressively than others?
5 For the first mention of the distinction between te rritorial and transactional see the Economist’s “Ou tsmarted by Sinaloa.” Chapter three provides a typology of ins urgent, transactional and territorial illicit netwo rks the latter two of which are primarily profit-seeking. Explaining why states attack insurgent networks is obvious. T hey are political entities seeking to overthrow the state a nd supplant it. Explaining why states attack some profit-seeking illicit networks and not others is thus far more in teresting and important. 2010j. 6 Ibid.
3
These questions have important implications for international relati ons and globalization debates on the future of the sovereign state system under conditions of globalization. Many have argued that the state is “withering” or “losing control” in the face of globalization and expanded markets. 7 Part of this debate is the affect of what Peter Andreas c alls “illicit globalization.” 8
Scholars like Phil Williams, Arquilla and Ronfeldt and Moíses Naím have warned of the coming threat of illicit “netwar” or illicit networked actors that “nimbly” “outmaneuver” the state. 9
Andreas has countered that the threat illicit networks pose has be en “overblown” and that states strengthen themselves through the very fight with illicit networks . 10
This dissertation contributes to this debate by elucidating which profit-seeking illicit networks t rigger a violent state reaction, which illicit networks are likely to survive and how the symbiotic relationshi ps that allow them to survive are likely to affect the character of states under conditions of globalization. Illicit Economies The exponential expansion of licit markets in the 20 th century has been well documented, but lesser studied are the important illicit economies that thrive in their shadow. Illicit economies exist in “ungoverned spaces” but also exist in what we w ould consider well-governed “spaces,” e.g. narcotics sales in cities with low crime i n Western Europe and copyright-piracy resulting in billions of dollars of losses in the United States. 11 Vanda Felbab-Brown utilizes the term “illicit economy” in lieu of “black markets” because th e term better encapsulates the nature of the “scope and extent of many illicit economies.” 12 It is in illicit economies that illicit
