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Assessing safety culture, values, practices, and outcomes

Dissertation
Author: Everon C. Chenhall
Abstract:
The purpose of this study was to identify where safety performance improvements can be made, thus establishing a foundation for further study by the company to formulate specific recommendations within the identified areas. The data were analyzed to determine whether five organizational practices and values described herein were predictors of 2009 safety performance. Accordingly, this non-experimental comparative study examined differences in safety culture dimensions between plants that achieved and failed to achieve their 2009 safety goals. The Competing Values Framework (Quinn & Kimberly, 1984) was adapted to assess safety culture strengths and congruencies among plants as an extension of the work of Silva, Lima, and Baptista (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997, p. 643; 2004, p. 643) and Díaz-Cabrera (2007). Additionally, the underlying values, leadership types, and culture orientations measured through the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices were tested for the first time as predictors of accident data. Despite considerable research on safety climate and culture predictors of accidents in organizations (Clarke, 2006), "the practical significance of these factors in the prevention of accidents remains undetermined" (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997, p.643). The researcher analyzed the combination of the difference and associational research questions. Exploration of the first research question involved analyzing the differences among the plants based on the results of the One-Way ANOVA for the five safety culture values and practices scores. Research question two was subdivided into three questions to clarify the three safety performance indicators (OSHA, LTA, and severity). The results of the independent t -tests compared the safety culture values and practices scores across the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 2009 safety goals for Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA) incident rates, Lost Time Away (LTA), and severity. Additionally, the five safety culture values and practices scores were compared across geographic regions for research question three. Finally, regression was run to determine if a combination of the safety culture values and practices scores were predictive of 2009 OSHA, LTA, and severity rates. Research question five was subdivided into three questions regarding differences on the safety culture type. To answer the three research questions, t -tests were conducted to examine differences among the plants' three safety outcomes and the plants' averages for each of the four safety culture types. Neither safety culture type scores nor safety culture values and practices scores were predictors of 2009 OSHA, LTA, or severity rates. The t -test results indicated large effects on a) company values, b) communication, c) and usage of accident information between the four plants that did and did not achieve 2009 LTA and severity goals, despite non-significant results. Differences among the plants were noted and analyzed for trends.

viii CONTENTS ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION ............................................................................... iii   ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................. v   CONTENTS ................................................................................................................... viii   CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ...................................... 1   Research Problem .............................................................................................. 3   Purpose ................................................................................................... 3   Research Questions ................................................................................ 4   Limitations and Assumptions ............................................................................ 7   Delimitations ...................................................................................................... 7   Significance of the Study ................................................................................... 8   Researcher’s Perspective ................................................................................... 9   CHAPTER TWO-LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................. 10   Distinction Between Organizational Culture and Climate ................................. 12   Relationship Between Organizational Culture, Organizational Practices, and Organizational Performance .............................................................................. 15   Safety culture defined ............................................................................ 16   Distinction Between Safety Culture Versus Safety Climate .................. 20   Relationship Between Safety Culture, Organizational Practices, and Safety Performance Indicators ...................................................................................... 21   Relationship Between Values and Leadership Styles Related to Safety 28   Applying Competing Values Framework to Leadership and Organizational Practices ................................................................................................. 30   Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices .......................... 31   Research Design for Dissertation Study ............................................................ 33   Safety Culture Values and Practices Variables ...................................... 35   Safety Outcome Variables ..................................................................... 36   CHAPTER THREE - METHODS ................................................................................. 39   Research Design and Rationale ......................................................................... 39   Theoretical Frame and Grounding of Proposed Methodology .............. 40   Conceptual Framework .......................................................................... 41   Site and Participants ........................................................................................... 45  

ix Physical Setting ...................................................................................... 45   Participants ............................................................................................. 45   Data Collection .................................................................................................. 45   Procedure ............................................................................................... 46   Instrumentation ...................................................................................... 49   Reliability ............................................................................................... 50   Field Test ............................................................................................... 51   Exploratory Factor Analysis .................................................................. 52   Internal Validity ..................................................................................... 57   External Validity .................................................................................... 57   Measures ................................................................................................ 59   General Demographics ........................................................................... 61   CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS ...................................................................................... 66   Introduction ........................................................................................................ 66   Research Question One ...................................................................................... 66   Results of Games-Howell Post Hoc Multiple Comparison Test ........... 69   Research Question Two ..................................................................................... 72   Research Question Three ................................................................................... 78   Research Question Four ..................................................................................... 80   Research Question Five ..................................................................................... 82   CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION .................................................................................. 84   Summary of the Study ....................................................................................... 84   Overview of the problem ....................................................................... 84   Instrument Modification ........................................................................ 85   Overview of the Findings................................................................................... 86   Research Question One .......................................................................... 86   Research Question Two ......................................................................... 88   Research Question Three ....................................................................... 90   Research Question Four ......................................................................... 91   Research Question Five ......................................................................... 91   Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 92   Analyses of Effect Sizes ........................................................................ 93   Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research ....................... 96   Recommendations for Practice .............................................................. 97   REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 98   Appendix A .................................................................................................................... 108   Appendix B .................................................................................................................... 109  

x Appendix C .................................................................................................................... 110   Appendix D .................................................................................................................... 111   Appendix E .................................................................................................................... 113   Appendix E .................................................................................................................... 115   Appendix F..................................................................................................................... 116   Appendix G .................................................................................................................... 117   Appendix H .................................................................................................................... 119   Appendix I ..................................................................................................................... 121  

xi LIST OF TABLES

TABLE Page 1. Definition of Key Terms………………………………………………………………..5 2. Selected Definitions of Organizational Culture and Climate…………………………14 3. Selected Definitions of Safety Culture and Characteristics…………………………...18 4. Summary of Select Empirical Studies since 1997 on Safety Climate and Culture Variables and Safety Performance Indicators……………………………………………24

5. Reliability Statistics By Factor…………………………………………………………..…..51 6. Rotated Component Matrix………………………………………………………………………… …………54

7. Factor Loadings, Total Variance Explained by Factors, Reliability, and Corrected Item Total Correlations……………………………………………………………………......55

8. Completed Surveys by Total Employees Crosstabulation……………….....................58 9. Plant by Q1Crosstabulation…………………………………………………………...63 10. Intentions for Answering Research Questions……………………………………….64 11. One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Summary Table Comparing Plants to the Safety Culture Values and Practice Factors……………………………….68

12. Means, Standard Deviations, and Significant Differences Among Plants and Safety Culture Values and Practices Factors………………………………………..70

13. Summated Means and Standard Deviations of Safety Culture Values and Practices Scores by Plants That Achieved and Failed to Achieve 2009 OSHA Goals…………….75

14. Summated Means and Standard Deviations of Safety Culture Values and Practices scores by Plants That Achieved and Failed to Achieve 2009 LTA Goals……………….76

15. Means of Summated Scores and Standard Deviations of Safety Culture Values and Practices Scores by Plants That Achieved and Failed to Achieve 2009 Severity Goals……………………………………………………………………...77

16. Means and Standard Deviations of Safety culture values and practices scores By Plants in Two Geographic Regions Means and Standard Deviations of Safety culture values and practices scores By Plants in Two Geographic Regions……………………..79

xii LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE Page 1. Study Outline …………………………………………………………………….6 2. Literature Review Concept Map…………………………………………………12 3. Safety Culture Models…………………………………………………………...44 4. Dissertation Study Procedure…………………………………………………….49 5. Sampling Design…………………………………………………………………58 6. Company tenure …………………………………………………………………62 7. Frequency of Employees By Work Shift ………………………………………..62 8. Mean safety culture values and practices scores are presented by plant according to company values, leadership style, motivation, communication, and usage of accident information……………………………………………………………..88

9. The mean scores for company values……………………………………………90

1

CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND DuPont, a multinational chemical corporation and nationally recognized leader in state-of-the-art safety interventions, asserts that "all injuries and occupational illnesses can be prevented” (Dupont, 1994, p. 1.2). The accepted practice is that there is no such thing as an "accident.” DuPont’s proactive safety management philosophy is driven by decades of culture emphasis on safety management, which has historically been actively embraced and empowered by the most senior levels of company management. In recognition of its widely acclaimed role in safety leadership, DuPont received the Excellence in Safety Training Award from Workplace HR & Safety magazine in 2007 (DuPont, 2007). Another major chemical corporation, 3-M, places emphasis on standardizing and enforcing safety policies and procedures at all plants worldwide, even off shore plants, where government mandated safety requirements are absent or unenforced. Case studies and literature reviews (Boin & Schulman, 2008; Chang & Liang, 2009; Findley, Smith, Gorski, & O'Neil, 2007; Robson et al., 2007) featured multiple organizations that have also followed suit and demonstrated a commitment to occupational health and safety programs and projects. During the exploratory phase of this study, the researcher investigated anomalies in potential predictors of safety performance. Some of the anomalies among organizations included clearly articulated methodologies for assessing safety hazards, regular audits, key safety interventions, and required employee and management training.

2 Policy and regulatory requirements have an acknowledged impact on safety performance, but excellence can only be achieved by factoring purposeful interventions into the organizational culture. Therefore, is it possible to connect methodologies of safety management to the organizational culture? Simon and Cistaro (2009) claimed that "safety excellence is a product not only of the right programs…but also of the right culture” (p.30). They proceeded to describe how safety is analogous to a stew with broth. "Safety programs are the ingredients in the stew-policies, systems and processes as the meat and vegetables, while the prevailing culture is the broth. If the ingredients are cooking in a wholesome broth-a positive safety culture of trust, caring, responsible leadership-everything works to its potential." (p. 30) Approached from the disciplines of organizational performance and change and occupational health and safety, this study was designed to analyze the perceptions of values and organizational practices related to safety culture. This exploratory study was performed in an undisclosed company consisting of 19 plants with similar operations throughout the United States and Canada. For feasibility purposes, this study included eight plants. This study was designed to ensure that plants within distinct regions of the United States were included to account for any variances that might be attributable to geographic location. This study will be based on the models representing four types of safety culture as follows: the Human Relations (Support), Open Systems (Innovation), Internal Processes (Policies), and Rational Goals (Goals). Dimensions of five organizational practices and values are presented in association with each of the safety culture models from the work

3 of Díaz-Cabrera, Hernández-Fernaud, and Isla-Díaz (2007) and adapted from Cameron and Quinn’s (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 2006) Competing Values Framework (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 2006). The Competing Values Framework classifies the values, practices, and leadership styles according to culture type. Culture types are presented along a continuum according to whether the organization has an internal or external focus and whether the organization is typified by stability and control or by flexibility and discretion (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 2006).

Research Problem The research literature discusses several approaches to developing a positive safety culture. However, most of the research does not classify types of positive safety culture according to the culture dimensions specific to both values and organizational practices. Despite multiple attempts to explain safety culture through competing models, there is limited empirical research to substantiate which company values and organizational safety practices have the most demonstrative impact on safety performance at the plant level. Purpose The purpose of this study was to prevent workplace injuries and lost time through improved organizational safety practices in an undisclosed company. Accordingly, this study examined differences in safety culture dimensions between plants that achieved and failed to achieve their 2009 safety goals. The safety culture dimensions of the five organizational values and practices were examined in relation to Occupational Safely and Health Administration (OSHA), Lost Time Away (LTA), and severity rates.

4 Research Questions The following overarching research questions were formulated from the work of Díaz-Cabrera et al. (2007), the Competing Values Framework (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 2006), and discussions with the organization’s safety management team. Research questions were developed to study which combination of safety culture type scores, for each of the five organizational practices and values, predict safety performance by plant in the undisclosed organization. The criteria or dependent variables were the safety performance measures, whereas the predictors or independent variables were the culture type scores representative of the dimensions of organizational practices and values. 1. Are there differences among the eight plants based on the average of the summated safety culture values and practices scores? 2. Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 2009 safety goals in regard to the average of the summated safety culture values and practices scores? 3. Are there differences in the averages of the summated safety culture values and practices scores by geographic region? 4. How well do the individual and combined safety culture values and practices scores predict 2009 plant safety performance? 5. Are there differences between the plants that achieved and plants that failed to achieve 2009 safety goals in regard to the average of the summated safety culture type?

5 Table 1 Definition of Key Terms Authors’ Definitions of Terms Term in This Study Six organizational processes are the characteristics of the four safety culture models adapted from the Competing Values Framework. The term was modified and referred to the five organizational practices and values due to variations in English translation from Spanish and the exclusion of training programs.

Safety culture profile: Diaz-Cabrera’s (2007) Safety culture profile encompasses the five organizational practices and values and the corresponding four safety culture types

Safety culture profile: encompasses the five organizational practices and values and the corresponding four safety culture types Recordable incident rate defined by OSHA Section 1904.4 as follows: “mathematical calculation that describes the number of employees per 100 full-time employees that have been involved in a recordable injury or illness” Subpart C – Recordkeeping Forms and Recording Criteria (66 FR 6123, Jan. 19, 2001) (OSHA, 2009).

Note to Subpart C: This Subpart describes the work-related injuries and illnesses that an employer must enter into the OSHA records and explains the OSHA forms that employers must use to record work-related fatalities, injuries, and illnesses.

OSHA rates or OSHA recordable rates (See Appendix A) Lost time case rate is the “number of lost time cases per 100 full-time employees in any given time frame”(OSHA, 2009).

LTA rates (See Appendix B) Severity rate is “a calculation that gives a company an average of lost days per recordable incident” (OSHA, 2009) Severity rates (See Appendix C)

6

Figure 1. Study Outline

1) Safety Culture 3) Culture Models (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007) are the culture types indicative of approach and dimensions for each of the practices and underlying values.  Supportive  Innovative  Policy-Oriented  Goals-Oriented 2) Organizational Practices and Values  Leadership style of immediate supervisor  Incident and accident reporting system  Safety culture type of safety rules and procedures  Safe behavior promotion and motivational strategies  Organizational communication systems  Safety standard procedures and p olicies

7 Limitations and Assumptions Senior management of the undisclosed company invited this researcher to study unexplained variations in safety performance indicators among the four plants classified as those that meet 2009 safety goals and the four that did not achieve the 2009 safety goals. The company selected the eight plants according to OSHA, Lost Time Away (LTA), and severity rates. The company provided the 2009 OSHA recordable rates, LTA, and severity rates. Management also considered geographic region and proprietary information, such as accident related costs, as the basis for inclusion of plants in this study. This study was not designed for the results to be generalized to other companies; however, the results likely have applications for the other plants within the company with homogeneous operations. A significant limitation is the lack of control the researcher had at each plant. For example, turnover rates and company and job tenure varied by plant and thus impacted this study’s validity. Additionally, the assumption was made that respondents were honest and provided meaningful survey responses. Delimitations The focus of this study was exclusively on the organizational practices and values associated with employees and managers and their values, beliefs, and perceptions. Furthermore, the Competing Values Framework did not display the linkage between organizational culture and technical systems, such as equipment design and work processes. Therefore, this study did not account for the gaps in the technical systems that might be linked to performance. However, the plants included in this study had essentially the same operations and processes.

8 The researcher clearly established the following parameters for this study: 1. The organization selected for this study was based on convenience sampling in selecting a single organization. 2. The organization desires to improve safety performance. 3. The plants have similar operations and processes. 4. The organization has some plants that have significant variations in safety performance outcomes, such as recordable incident rates and lost time. 5. This study was limited by data that could be collected via a paper questionnaire. 6. This study is limited to a total of eight plants that did and did not meet the company’s 2009 safety goals. 7. The scope of this study is limited to production and maintenance employees and first line supervisors. Significance of the Study Research has not confirmed whether the Competing Values Framework can be applied to diagnosing and changing safety culture (Díaz-Cabrera et al., 2007). Accordingly, the results of this study could inform future studies on the predictive validity of the Safety Culture Values and Practices instrument by comparing safety culture type scores with safety performance. An understanding of which organizational practices and values have the most demonstrative impact on safety performance can enhance further research on developing the “optimal profile” and model of safety culture (Diaz-Cabrera, 2007, p. 17).

9 Researcher’s Perspective Based on my work experiences in corporate offices, small businesses, and universities, I have observed a variety of organizational cultures. Witnessing firsthand the impact of culture on behavior, I have noticed new employees’ and managers’ efforts to conform to acceptable workplace practices. It is difficult to adopt certain practices if they do not align with one’s values. I have also noticed how certain work values and beliefs about an organization drove certain behaviors. Some managers and employees had values congruent with the organization, while others did not. Although I could not directly measure the impact of differing values on the organization’s overall performance, I sensed the tension in how work was performed, how employees were managed, and how conflicting approaches to adopting new practices were handled. I also experienced the pain of working in organizations where culture change was desperately needed, but did not occur. Safety is a prime example of a critical organizational component that can be studied in relation to culture as evidenced by leadership and employee behaviors and attitudes, performance management systems, and communications. Leadership style, management, and employee practices are indicative of specific values. A study on safety permitted me to study the relationship between indicators of safety values at various levels of the organization and the corresponding safety performance outcomes. I am viewing the organization in this study as an external consultant to maximize objectivity in analyzing the data. I am willing to be open to whatever I may discover as I study this topic in greater depth.

10 CHAPTER TWO-LITERATURE REVIEW As of October 2009, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that the total workforce in the United States was approximately 154 million (2009b), all of whom are potentially susceptible to injuries on-the-job. Even with stringent Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations covering virtually all organizations, and not withstanding each individual employer's commitment to safety, on-the-job deaths and injuries occur at alarming rates. Tragically, there were 3.7 million non-fatal injuries in 2008 among all private industry employers. More than 50% of the 3.7 million injuries were serious and involved job transfers or days away from work (BLS, 2009a). The United States had 14,071 million employees in manufacturing during 2007, of which there were 5.6 total recordable cases of injuries and illnesses per 100 employees (BLS, 2009a). With advances in manufacturing technology including robotics, and considering decades long OSHA requirements and enforcement, why does the manufacturing sector continue to have unacceptably high incident rates according to OSHA standards? After all, safety performance is one of the few areas in which the individual organization has more management control than most any other aspect of the operation of the business enterprise, including sales, competitive conditions, market conditions, and raw material costs, to name just a few. In short, external forces do not dictate safety performance. This literature review is organized according to concepts that emanated from the purpose and research problem, and were derived from business related safety studies published in journal articles, dissertations, and meta analyses, as presented in the concept map below. Keyword searches and the overall methodology for locating relevant research

11 is referenced in Appendices D and E. Empirical safety studies on climate/culture and safety performance indicators from 1997 to 2008 were selected for the review of literature. The review begins with the higher order concepts (Gloeckner, 2009), namely organizational culture, climate, and organizational performance and proceeds to explain the relationship among safety culture, climate, organizational practices, and the prediction of safety outcome variables. 1. Definitions and distinctions between culture and climate are presented. 2. The research design and summary of findings for safety culture and safety climate studies are provided. 3. Furthermore, this review of literature will provide a background for understanding the design of this study, to include the rationale for the selection of independent and dependent research variables. 4. Studies included in the review were selected according to their emphasis on safety culture and or climate and safety performance.

12 Leadership  Style  & Values Safety  Culture  (Competing  Values  Framework) Safety Climate Safety Practices 1.Incident and accident reporting system 2.Safe behavior promotion and motivational strategies 3.Organizational communication systems 4.Safety standard procedures and policies Predicting Safety  Outcomes 1.) OSHA Recordables 2.) Lost Time 3.) Severity Literature Review Conceptual Map Organizational     Culture

Figure 2. Literature Review Concept Map Distinction Between Organizational Culture and Climate Schein defined organizational culture as “A pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with the problems of external adaptation and internal integration that all works well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (1992, p. 9). Essentially, organizational culture refers to “what employees perceive to be the pattern of beliefs, values, and expectations that guide behavior and practice within an

13 organization” (Gilley & Maycunich Gilley, 2003, p. 149). Further, Schein (2004) distinguished levels of an organization’s culture by “artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions” (2004, p. 46). Organizational artifacts include “visible structures and processes” (1992, p. 26) such as organizational charts and policies, which provide insight into the daily functioning of an organization. Artifacts are indicators of organizational beliefs and values, but may not mirror the actual values of individual managers. Several scholars differentiate climate from culture based on the level of analysis. As such, climate is focused on the work group or micro level of the organization, whereas, culture is reflective of the overall organization (Burke, 2008; Gilley & Maycunich Gilley, 2003; Schneider, 1985). Organizational performance and change models, such as Gilley and Maycunich’s (2003) Organizational System Blueprint Model, illustrate the relationship between climate and culture based on the micro and macro levels of the organization. Safety climate is one of the organizational components of culture that is connected directly to the mission, strategy, and organizational practices. Work climate is linked to managerial practices and organizational processes, including communications and decision-making. Ultimately, the organizational processes and individual and organizational performance are tied to the organization’s performance results. Climate is differentiated from culture as referenced in Table 2, in that it refers to employee attitudes and perceptions affecting colleagues’ “day-to-day work together on the job” (Burke, 2008, p. 185). According to Schein, culture is defined as “systems of shared meanings, assumptions, and underlying values” (Schein, 1985, as cited in

14 Schneider, 1990, p. 22). Burke also makes a distinction between climate and culture with regard to time in terms of short-lived perceptions and attitudes versus more long-term organizational attributes. Table 2 Selected Definitions of Organizational Culture and Climate. Organizational Culture Organizational Climate “Culture is more background and defined by beliefs and values. The level of analysis for culture is the organization” (Burke, 2008, p. 184). “Climate is defined in terms of perceptions that individuals have of how their local work unit is managed and how effectively they and their day-to-day colleagues work together on the job. The level of analysis, therefore, is the group, the work unit. Climate is much more in the foreground of organizational members’ perceptions” (Burke, 2008, p. 185) “Systems of shared meanings, assumptions, and underlying values” (Schein, 1985, as cited in Schneider, 1990, p. 22) Organizational climate generally refers to how employees perceive their work environment, which influences their work-related attitudes and behaviors. It provides a frame of reference through which individuals make sense of organizational life (Joyce & Slocum, 1984, as cited in Ngo, Foley, & Loi, 2009, p. 668). “A set of understandings or meanings shared by a group of people. The meanings are largely tacit among members, are clearly relevant to the particular group, and are distinctive to the group. Meanings are passed on to new group members” (Louis, 1980, as cited in Frost, Moore, Louis, Lundberg, & Martin, 1985) Burton, Lauridsen, and Obel (2004, p. 69) defined organizational climate as ‘‘an individual’s attitude concerning the organization, comprised of its degree of trust, morale, conflict, rewards equity, leader credibility, resistance to change, and scapegoating.’’ “Any social group, to the extent that it is a distinctive unit, will have to some degree a culture differing from that of other groups, a somewhat different set of common understandings around which action is organized, and these differences will find expression in a language whose nuances are peculiar to that group” (Becker Bowen and Ostroff (2004, as cited in Ngo et al., 2009, p. 669) argued that a strong organizational climate affects how employees share a common interpretation of what behaviors are expected and rewarded, and hence a situation is created for better organizational performance.

Full document contains 141 pages
Abstract: The purpose of this study was to identify where safety performance improvements can be made, thus establishing a foundation for further study by the company to formulate specific recommendations within the identified areas. The data were analyzed to determine whether five organizational practices and values described herein were predictors of 2009 safety performance. Accordingly, this non-experimental comparative study examined differences in safety culture dimensions between plants that achieved and failed to achieve their 2009 safety goals. The Competing Values Framework (Quinn & Kimberly, 1984) was adapted to assess safety culture strengths and congruencies among plants as an extension of the work of Silva, Lima, and Baptista (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997, p. 643; 2004, p. 643) and Díaz-Cabrera (2007). Additionally, the underlying values, leadership types, and culture orientations measured through the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices were tested for the first time as predictors of accident data. Despite considerable research on safety climate and culture predictors of accidents in organizations (Clarke, 2006), "the practical significance of these factors in the prevention of accidents remains undetermined" (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997, p.643). The researcher analyzed the combination of the difference and associational research questions. Exploration of the first research question involved analyzing the differences among the plants based on the results of the One-Way ANOVA for the five safety culture values and practices scores. Research question two was subdivided into three questions to clarify the three safety performance indicators (OSHA, LTA, and severity). The results of the independent t -tests compared the safety culture values and practices scores across the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 2009 safety goals for Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA) incident rates, Lost Time Away (LTA), and severity. Additionally, the five safety culture values and practices scores were compared across geographic regions for research question three. Finally, regression was run to determine if a combination of the safety culture values and practices scores were predictive of 2009 OSHA, LTA, and severity rates. Research question five was subdivided into three questions regarding differences on the safety culture type. To answer the three research questions, t -tests were conducted to examine differences among the plants' three safety outcomes and the plants' averages for each of the four safety culture types. Neither safety culture type scores nor safety culture values and practices scores were predictors of 2009 OSHA, LTA, or severity rates. The t -test results indicated large effects on a) company values, b) communication, c) and usage of accident information between the four plants that did and did not achieve 2009 LTA and severity goals, despite non-significant results. Differences among the plants were noted and analyzed for trends.