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A nature of value

ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 2009
Dissertation
Author: Alan P Petrie
Abstract:
Providing a viable account of the independent value of natural objects as the ground on which to justify environmental preservation and conservation has proven a difficult task. Demonstrations of the existence and source of mind-independent values have not only failed to gamer widespread support they raise some serious questions about the efficacy of appealing to such values as a means to persuading the uninterested. The strategy adopted here, then, seeks to avoid the controversial nature of mind-independent value, and some of the practical problems associated with appeals to the same as a means to changing minds, by focusing instead on the subjective conditions of valuing; subjective conditions that, in order to get at the heart of the matter, are, following Harry Frankfurt, characterized in terms of the subjective conditions of love. This account examines the reasons people have for respecting others' loving commitments to their most cherished natural objects and areas. The nature and force of these reasons are revealed through the examination of a Rawlsian-style contractualist account of justice. The modification of the model conception of the person in the initial choice situation to reflect the subjective conditions of love provides the ground for both the adoption of a new principle of justice and the casting of a role for the nature-lover to play as the value-surrogate of her beloved object. The new principle of justice gives priority to the demands of lovers over the mere preference satisfaction of others and the role of the lover as value-surrogate gives her, among other things, the power to demand certain formal criteria be met by any policy proposal directly affecting the well-being of her beloved as a means to ensuring that it receives adequate protections.

Contents Abstract v Acknowledgements vii Chapter 1; Introduction 1 Chapter 2; The Nature of Value 2.1 Introduction 25 2.2 A Taxonomy of Value 28 2.3 Substantive Accounts 32 2.4 Conclusion 59 Chapter 3; The Love of Nature 3. 1 Introduction 67 3.2 Motivation and Defense for Taking Love Seriously 68 3.3 Love & Frankfurt's Non-quality Theory 75 3.4 The Value and Essential Conditions of Love 84 3.5 Conditions of Appropriateness 99 3.6 Conclusion I l l Chapter 4; Love & Justice 4.1. Introduction 121 4.2 The Circumstances and Principles of Justice 123 4.3 The Original Position & the Concept of a Person 129 4.4 Love 137 i i i

4.5 Primary Goods and the Preservation Principle 146 4.6 The Strains of Commitment and Stability 152 4.7 The Strains of Love 164 4.8 Conclusion 169 Chapter 5; Applications 5.1 Introduction 178 5.2 The Priority of the Right in Application 184 5.3 The Value-Surrogate 189 5.4 Legitimizing Commitments 195 5.5 Hell's Canyon: the role of the value-surrogate 204 5.6 Conclusion 209 Chapter 6: Conclusion 6.1 An Environmental Ethic? 214 6.2 Love and Justice (The First Challenge) 220 6.3 Animal Welfare (The Second Challenge) 225 6.4 The Final Word 230 References 232 IV

ABSTRACT A Nature of Value by ALAN P. PETRIE Providing a viable account of the independent value of natural objects as the ground on which to justify environmental preservation and conservation has proven a difficult task. Demonstrations of the existence and source of mind-independent values have not only failed to garner widespread support they raise some serious questions about the efficacy of appealing to such values as a means to persuading the uninterested. The strategy adopted here, then, seeks to avoid the controversial nature of mind-independent value, and some of the practical problems associated with appeals to the same as a means to changing minds, by focusing instead on the subjective conditions of valuing; subjective conditions that, in order to get at the heart of the matter, are, following Harry Frankfurt, characterized in terms of the subjective conditions of love. This account examines the reasons people have for respecting others' loving commitments to their most cherished natural objects and areas. The nature and force of these reasons are revealed through the examination of a Rawlsian- style contractualist account of justice. The modification of the model conception of the person in the initial choice situation to reflect the subjective conditions of love provides the ground for both the adoption of a new principle of justice and the casting of a role for the nature-lover to play as the value-surrogate of her beloved object. The new principle of justice gives priority to the demands of lovers over the mere

preference satisfaction of others and the role of the lover as value-surrogate gives her, among other things, the power to demand certain formal criteria be met by any policy proposal directly affecting the well-being of her beloved as a means to ensuring that it receives adequate protections.

Acknowledgements Of course I want to thank the members of the dissertation committee—Dan, David, and Ravi—for seeing this thing through to the end. I also want to thank Paul Roth for chairing the QE committee and for his support as Chair of the UCSC Philosophy Dept. However, I owe a huge debt to Dan Guevara, my advisor, for his unwavering support of this project extending over an almost six-year period. Thanks. vn

Chapter 1: Introduction The Coast Redwood has become a symbol of the modern environmental movement. Many battles have taken place between preservationists and timber companies over the fate of Redwood forests.1 At the root of many of these conflicts can be discovered a basic disagreement over the nature of the value of nature. For timber companies these forests have a certain instrumental value. A tree is valuable insofar as it can be utilized as a resource for the production of other human goods. Redwood trees, for example, are the means to such ends as decks and fences. Ecologists may counter any exclusiveness suggested by such claims by pointing to other instrumentally valuable aspects of forests such as their roles as carbon fixers, water purifiers, and storehouses of biodiversity. Some environmentalists, on the other hand, would claim that Redwood trees and forests are objectively valuable, that is, they are valuable in and of themselves and, as such, they should be treated as ends-in- themselves and not valued merely as the means to other purported goods.2 Thus environmental philosophers on both sides of the debate have exerted much effort in an attempt to clear up, once and for all, the controversy surrounding the value of nature in the hope, we might suppose, of removing one of the obstacles to a satisfactory resolution of these kinds of conflicts. However, the controversy surrounding the nature of value has been with us since at least the time of Plato. There are basically two theoretical positions taken by value theorists distinguishable in terms of where they locate the source of value. 1

These positions will be referred to here as "value objectivism" and "value subjectivism". Roughly speaking, value objectivism holds value to be, in some sense, independent of the beliefs and attitudes of the valuer whereas value subjectivism denies this, claiming value to be essentially a function of the valuing subject. There are compelling considerations in favor of each of these two basic views which adds to the difficulty of giving a theoretical account of the nature of value acceptable to all. But, when it comes to considerations aimed at settling basic conflicts of interests, the ideal of consensual agreement is, I take it, one worth pursuing. John Rawls recognized the difficulty of securing a consensus on controversial doctrines and so he took as a basic constraint on his argument for principles of justice what he refers to as "the fact of reasonable pluralism" (Rawls 1999g, 573).4 Rawls brings attention to the fact that there are a plethora of comprehensive doctrines5 each recommending different and sometimes incompatible conceptions of the good. Rawls contends that this fact is not simply a temporary state of modern society. As he puts it, "This diversity of doctrines - the fact of pluralism - is not a mere historical condition that will soon pass away; it is, I believe, a permanent feature of the public culture of modern democracies" (Rawls 1999h, 425). Thus, Rawls seeks, to the extent possible, to avoid basing his argument on controversial comprehensive doctrines. Due to the stubbornness of the problem of delivering an acceptable account of the nature of value and the desire to secure a consensus, to the extent possible, on any proposal for adjudicating conflicts of interests, we would do well to follow Rawls in seeking a less 2

controversial starting point. We can interpret appeals to the objective value of ends, like those of the above-mentioned environmentalist, in two ways. In the first instance we can take them literally as claims about the value of the objects or states-of-affairs themselves in which case, given the controversial nature of objective value, it would not be unreasonable of an adversary to dismiss them as false.6 On the other hand, we can take them not as claims about the nature of objects or states-of-affairs, but simply as claims about the beliefs or attitudes of the valuers and thus as expressions of the way in which they are valued.7 Taken in the latter sense, there seems to be no real problem in understanding how the claims could be true and accepting their truth does not necessarily commit us to value subjectivism. In general, value objectivists do not deny the subjective conditions of valuing they just insist that, in addition, a complete theory of value must also take into account certain objective conditions—the conditions that account for the value of the objects and states-of-affairs themselves. And it is not hard to understand how a person might be mistaken about her end's true value whereas it would be implausible to claim that people are generally mistaken about the value they attribute to their ends. Claiming, for instance, that one values nature as an end-in-itself is not only uncontroversial, it is quite common. Thus, generally speaking, the challenge is, in taking facts about what people actually value as ends-in-themselves as a starting point, to determine the conditions under which those facts can be reasons for others to respect those ends while 3

remaining agnostic with respect to the existence of objective value, that is, without appealing to the truth of claims made in favor of the value of the objects or states-of- affairs themselves. This project has three basic parts: to determine, on subjective grounds, the conditions that render the commitment to a particular end normative for the valuing agent; to identify a set of circumstances within which agent-specific normativity can give rise to reasons for others to respect that which is in fact so valued; and lastly, to give an account of what such respect implies using it as the basis for principles which can be appealed to in cases of conflict. In taking this strategy we want to preserve the phenomenal character of valuing objects for their own sakes while remaining agnostic with respect to the possibility of objective value. We can accomplish these objectives by taking seriously the subjective conditions of the commitments people have to various ends, and by ruling out any appeals to the independent value of those ends on practical as opposed to theoretical grounds. Given the commitment to seek, to the extent possible, a consensually endorsed basis for settling conflicts of interests, and taking as a practical constraint Rawls's fact of pluralism, a natural way to proceed here, then, is to think of the problem from within the framework of a contractualist theory of justice. Just as the fact of pluralism rules out, for all practical purposes, the possibility of securing a consensus on our individual conceptions of the good, it rules out the possibility of securing a consensus on any conception of justice which is itself based on a controversial comprehensive doctrine. However, for those working within the 4

contractualist tradition such as John Rawls, justice is based on a consensual agreement (an agreement which, to the extent possible, does not rely on the acceptance of any substantive conception of the good or comprehensive doctrine) between persons who are out to secure a cooperative venture under which each has the freedom to pursue his or her own interests consistent with an equal freedom for all. On these accounts, conflicts like those between environmentalists and timber companies are conflicts of interests the adjudication of which falls within the scope of justice. However, the cutting of redwood trees per se does not. Justice on these contractualist views is not a matter of the preservation or maximization of some predetermined substantive conception of the good. The principles of justice are supposed to be regulative in that they stand as a framework within which individual's may pursue and promote their own interests. That is, these conceptions of justice are supposed to respect the fact of pluralism. In contractualist theories like Rawls's, the "contracting" parties are taken to be, to a certain degree, self-interested or, as Rawls put it, disinterested.9 Although it is not their only concern, each is out to secure for himself, to the extent possible, the means necessary for promoting and pursuing his conception of the good. And, given the nature of the current project I will be emphasizing this particular role for contractualist theories of justice. Rawls makes it clear that "Since the parties [to the contract] are determinate persons, they also try to ensure their own ability to pursue their particular aims and to protect the objects of their affections, whatever these are" 5

(Rawls 1999e, 334). Or, in the words of Brian Barry, a contractualist theorist who follows the strategy of T.M. Scanlon, "... a crucial task of justice ... is to mediate between conflicting conceptions of the good" (Barry 1995, 12).10 Therefore, the principles agreed to by the contracting parties should be applicable to, and help adjudicate, conflicts such as those between environmentalists and timber companies. The environmentalist, for instance, will look for a conception of justice that, as far as possible, respects her commitment to, and concern for, the Redwood forests ensuring her interests are given their due when the principles come to bear on conflicts such as the one under consideration. This need for balancing, or "mediating between", differing conceptions of the good is thought by some to be one of the appealing features of utilitarian accounts of justice. We might suggest that such accounts give equal consideration to all conceptions of the good by giving everyone an equal "voice" so each is heard when it is time to set policy or adjudicate conflicts.11 So, for instance, if more prefer to see the Redwood forests preserved than wish to have less expensive decks and fences, the trees are saved. But upon reflection we might question whether, for instance, in a conflict over the logging of a virgin Redwood forest my preference for cheaper fencing and the wishes of a conscientious environmentalist who has spent a good part of her life promoting and protecting the flourishing of this particular (her beloved) forest should be given equal consideration. Not because we will both agree that Redwood trees are more valuable than Redwood fences but because her commitment 6

is of a different order than is mine. If we agree, at least in this case, that her preference for the preservation of the forest should, in some sense, trump my preference for cheaper lumber then on a utilitarian view her commitment could be represented as a preference informed by a more intense desire. As such, so some 1 9 utilitarians claim, her concern can be adequately voiced by calculating the intensity of the desire and weighting her preference accordingly in the calculus. The question that needs to be asked, however, is whether the environmentalist's commitment to the flourishing of her beloved Redwood forest really is just a function of the intensity of a desire for the realization of that outcome. At the risk of being unoriginal, I contend the whole project of representing the various forms of human commitment, as the utilitarian does, by quantifying and weighting preferences based on the existence and intensity of desires for the realization of the preferred outcome grossly misrepresents the nature of human valuing.13 Even if we agree that the human good consists in the realization of one's commitments, the problem remains for the utilitarian if she tries to reduce these commitments to mere desires for particular outcomes. In that case, desires, regardless of their status, are given equal consideration being distinguished only by their intensity.1 Of course not all utilitarians suppose that all desires are worthy of satisfaction. Some would agree with Harry Frankfurt who points out that "... the mere fact that a person has a desire does not give him a reason" (Frankfurt 2006, ll).15 And 7

Rawls concurs; he claims that the satisfaction of mere desires has no value in itself. So Rawls endorses, as do some utilitarians17, the thought that it is the satisfaction of rational desires that constitutes the human good18 where rational desires are desires for those things that are rational for a person to pursue given his life plan.19 Given the importance to each of us of our life plans, the satisfaction of the associated rational desires are important to us and thus should be accounted for by principles of justice. Even so, I will argue that both utilitarians and certain contractualists like Rawls misrepresent the nature of human valuing. To accept the philosophical basis of utilitarianism is to accept everything as fungible and everything other than the requisite conception of human well-being as a mere means. But it is not clear that we do, or should, value everything else merely as a means to that end; on the contrary, it seems quite obvious that in many instances we value others (including non-human and even non-animal others) as ends-in-themselves without concern for how we will fair in such cases. Secondly, some utilitarian accounts, such as John Stuart Mill's, although they recognize that people value other things besides the requisite conception of human well-being as ends, virtue for instance (Mill 2001, 36), have to reduce all attachment to these various ends to desires differentiated by intensity only (or to human happiness straightaway) if they are to preserve the monolithic nature of utilitarianism (Mill 2001, 35). Even Allan Gibbard, while recognizing the nuances and complexities of human valuing, suggests that our ends need to be aggregatable, and thus reconcilable 8

upon a common "goal-scale" (Gibbard 2008, 70). This aggregation and maximization of human "well-being" relies on the fungibility of human ends. However, making all desires commensurate, as the utilitarian does, regardless of, for example, the role they play within the constitution of the human will ignores some fundamental differences between, for instance, mere desiring, caring, and loving, each of which, as emphasized by Frankfurt, constitutes a distinct way of valuing our various ends (Frankfurt 1999,158, 165). Rawls, although he escapes the charge of reducing all valuing to the maximization of a single good,21 and does not give any weight to the intensity of desires per se , makes two questionable assumptions regarding the nature of human valuing. First, Rawls considers as relevant only human commitment based on rationally chosen ends making, as the utilitarian does, no clear distinction between commitments based on desiring, caring, and loving. Secondly, although he does take into account the fact that human well-being is not the only thing we value as an end, his account, in what seems to be an attempt to preserve his commitment to the priority of the right over the good, does attribute to the person the dubious ability to freely revise or abandon her ends should they come into conflict with the principles of justice.23 However, taking the commitment of the environmentalist seriously brings us to the consideration of love. If, following Harry Frankfurt, we construe love in a very narrow sense as "a particular mode of caring" (Frankfurt 2006, 40) we come closer to 9

capturing the essential nature of the type of commitment we have to our most cherished ends. What we are here interested in is the fact that loving is a mode of valuing which carries with it certain requirements. The lover takes the beloved as an end-in-itself thus she is, among other things, committed to its flourishing for its own sake. And, as will be argued, the commitment of the lover, due to the non- substitutability for the lover of her beloved, is incommensurate with the commitment one has to those things or states-of-affairs that he or she merely desires (rationally or otherwise). As T.M. Scanlon points out, in some cases, when faced with conflicting ends, appeals to some reasons are not countervailing considerations but totally irrelevant (Scanlon 1998, 84). For instance, that a certain action is pleasurable counts as a reason in many circumstances to perform that action, but the nature-lover cannot accept that the pleasure associated with felling trees counts as a reason for doing that; in such cases that pleasure is not a reason to be counted among those in favor of cutting redwood trees; it is simply an irrelevant consideration. As should become clear, there is a sense in which the flourishing of the beloved object is not something that the lover simply prefers; it is something she needs. This need also rules out the possibility of adequately representing the lover's commitment as the focus of a rationally chosen conception of the good which can be revised and/or abandoned at will. Incommensurability of ends poses a problem for utilitarian accounts because it 10

undermines their monolithic nature leaving them no common measure on which to base aggregation and maximization. Not so for Rawlsian style contractualist accounts due to the fact that they leave some room for the pursuit of differing and sometimes conflicting conceptions of the good. However, revision in such a way as to allow for the integration of love's commitment as a highest-order interest may undermine the integrity of these accounts by threatening to undermine the priority to the right over the good. For instance, Rawls makes explicit the model conception of the person as one with certain interests and moral powers the effectiveness of which rely to some extent on the assumption that the commitment to one's most cherished ends is subordinate to the dictates of justice (Rawls 1999e, 313). As such, he contends people must be willing and able to abandon or revise their various ends should the pursuit of them conflict with the dictates of justice. Taking Rawls's theory of justice as the paradigm, it is on his account that I will concentrate. So part of the current project will entail a revision of Rawls's conception of the person to allow for consideration of the concerns of lovers for the well-being of their beloveds. And, as we would expect, this revision of the model conception of the person will be reflected in the principles of justice agreed to in the original position. Specifically, it will necessitate the adoption of a new principle of justice—the preservation principle—to follow in lexical order after a Rawlsian-style first principle of justice guaranteeing the basic human liberties. I will argue that love gives rise to desires the satisfaction of which are a good 11

and that they can compete with the satisfaction of desires that arise as a consequence of pursuing a rational life plan. That is, just as with rational desires loving desires are normative for the agent given the importance to her of the end at which they are aimed. On Rawls's account, rational plans, and thus their associated desires, are abandonable, or at least easily overridable, by our commitment to upholding the dictates of justice. Love, on the other hand, is to some extent non-voluntary, that is, love gives rise to desires, the source of which is not fully under our control (although, in most cases, we would not willingly give them up even if they were under our control). This non-voluntariness, coupled with the non-substitutability of the object of love gives rise to certain needs. The fact that these desires are worthy of satisfaction on their own account, and their satisfaction is something the lover needs, is sufficient to demand special consideration from principles of justice if, as mentioned above, part of one's reason (that is, one's motivation) for entering into the contract in the first place is to secure, to the extent possible, the means to pursue and realize one's conception of the good. I will therefore argue for the priority (not absolute) of the satisfaction of loving desires over rational (and therefore also mere or brute) desires. Knowing, under the epistemological constraints of Rawls's original position, that one will love something or other will result in the adoption of principles of justice that give special consideration to the claims of lovers regarding the objects of their love. As such, the environmentalist's demand for the preservation of her beloved woodland will not simply outweigh, for instance, my preference for cheaper lumber 12

(that is, it's not just more of the same such that we can calculate the balancing point) as would be the case under the weighted utilitarian calculation; it would have a qualified priority over considerations of maximizing want (or preference) satisfaction. Given this priority leaves open the possibility that a decision could fall in favor of the claims of the lover even if it can be demonstrated that overall utility would be maximized by the reverse decision. In this way the principles of justice can come to bear on conflicts like those between environmentalists and timber companies in such a way that due consideration is given to the fact that the Redwood trees in question are valued as ends-in-themselves. And this can be accomplished without establishing the objective value of Redwood trees to everyone's satisfaction. It should be emphasized that I am not interested in defending contractualism as sufficient to ground all our ethical concerns and I am not offering a comprehensive environmental ethic. No doubt some will complain that I am not offering an environmental ethic at all. My interest is much narrower. I am here merely attempting to give an account of the ways in which we value some of our ends, especially natural entities, and how those entities, and the commitments we have in their regard, play important roles in our lives. Given the central importance of our most cherished ends to each of us and the role they play in giving meaning to our lives seems to me sufficient reason to suppose that any adequate theory of justice must take such concerns into consideration. I am here interested in theories of justice as a means to uncovering the reasons 13

we have to respect each other's most cherished ends and purposes and sorting out conflicting claims made on their behalf. I will consider the broader and what some may think the more central concerns of social justice as a means to explicating the theories of interest and as needed to show how we might go about reconciling one's highest-order commitments with these broader concerns. In the end, I hope to show how taking account of these commitments within the framework of a contractualist theory of social justice gives, for example, the nature lovers' concerns their due when faced with conflicting interests which threaten her most cherished ends. I agree here with Frankfurt when he suggests that, "The most fundamental issues of practical reason cannot be resolved ... without an account of what people love" (Frankfurt 2004, 57). Of course, there is a question lurking in the background of the current discussion; the question about the choice of love as the proper characterization of our commitments to nature. It seems we can argue about, for instance, whether or not the nature-lover really does love trees and we can argue about whether or not Frankfurt's account captures what we normally mean by "love". However, what I hope will become clear is that whether we call it love or not, Frankfurt's account captures some of the essential features of our commitments (as selfless and non-voluntary) and the value to us of their objects (as ends-in-themselves and non-substitutable). Furthermore, we need to keep in mind that love is, for Frankfurt, a structural phenomenon. His is an account of the volitional structures associated with valuing 14

entities as ends-in-themselves, and a defense of such valuing as normative for the valuer. Although some may want to refer to the natural objects of their concern as "sacred" instead of beloved, setting aside religious connotations and appeals to objectivity, 25 such a commitment does seem to share some of the essentials of loving commitments such as valuing the object as an end-in-itself and taking it to be non- substitutable. Even so, on this account they would, for all practical purposes, count as nature-lovers. Likewise, some may prefer to characterize the nature-lover's commitment as one of "respect". Respect here would be taken as analogous to the Kantian idea of respect for persons as respecting their rational autonomy. As Christine Korsgaard points out, "While love moves you to pursue the ends of another, respect reminds you that she must determine what those ends are..." (Korsgaard 1996d, 191). Respect for nature in this sense is appealing because it seems to suggest that nature should be left to run her course.26 But love on Frankfurt's account is not essentially interventionist. The lover is concerned for the flourishing of the beloved for its own sake. If leaving the beloved untouched is the best means to ensure its flourishing, then the lover will do so. But whether or not that is the case is an empirical question not something that can be determined beforehand independently of the nature and circumstance of the particular object. Whether or not the lover is engaged in the active management of the beloved is not a question of love but a question, maybe a technical one requiring the input of 15

experts, of what course of action will best realize the flourishing of the object or area in question. There are of course many other ways to characterize the non-instrumental importance to us of the natural world many of which are ignored here for various reasons, but are not ruled out by our avoidance of appeals to objective value. My only hope is that the account offered here preserves the central characteristics and phenomenal nature of valuing common to many of these views while avoiding the controversy surrounding the objectivity of value. Frankfurt's is a non-quality (no reasons) view. This leaves open the reasons one might cite for his love but does not require any particular reasons. One might cite an area or object's naturalness, sacredness, aesthetic qualities, etc. as the reasons for his or her loving commitment. She may also claim that the reason she loves it—the reason she values it as an end-in-itself and takes it to be non-substitutable—is that it is what it is. But she might as well attribute its value to the fact that she loves it. Two implications of this are first that the account offered here is general and thus covers love for various objects other than what we may intuitively regard as natural; art, architecture and chainsaws, for instance. Secondly, as implied by the first, this account relieves us of the need to give a characterization of the natural; since being natural is not a necessary condition for being loved, we can avoid worries about offering the sufficient conditions for qualifying as such. Chapter 2: The Nature of Value 16

Full document contains 247 pages
Abstract: Providing a viable account of the independent value of natural objects as the ground on which to justify environmental preservation and conservation has proven a difficult task. Demonstrations of the existence and source of mind-independent values have not only failed to gamer widespread support they raise some serious questions about the efficacy of appealing to such values as a means to persuading the uninterested. The strategy adopted here, then, seeks to avoid the controversial nature of mind-independent value, and some of the practical problems associated with appeals to the same as a means to changing minds, by focusing instead on the subjective conditions of valuing; subjective conditions that, in order to get at the heart of the matter, are, following Harry Frankfurt, characterized in terms of the subjective conditions of love. This account examines the reasons people have for respecting others' loving commitments to their most cherished natural objects and areas. The nature and force of these reasons are revealed through the examination of a Rawlsian-style contractualist account of justice. The modification of the model conception of the person in the initial choice situation to reflect the subjective conditions of love provides the ground for both the adoption of a new principle of justice and the casting of a role for the nature-lover to play as the value-surrogate of her beloved object. The new principle of justice gives priority to the demands of lovers over the mere preference satisfaction of others and the role of the lover as value-surrogate gives her, among other things, the power to demand certain formal criteria be met by any policy proposal directly affecting the well-being of her beloved as a means to ensuring that it receives adequate protections.